Because the integrated circuit industry chain is extremely complex, there are many misunderstandings about the semiconductor industry chain. This article focuses on answering the five most common misunderstandings of domestic chips:
One, can you make a chip with a lithography machine?
In fact, lithography is only one of the seven major process links (lithography, etching, deposition, ion implantation, cleaning, oxidation, and inspection) of the semiconductor industry. Although it is one of the most important links, it leaves the other six links. None of them will work.
The manufacturing process of integrated circuits is divided into "three major" + "four small" processes:
three major (75%): photolithography, etching, deposition;
Four small (25%): cleaning, oxidation, detection, ion implantation.
Under normal circumstances, photolithography accounts for 30% of the investment in the entire production line equipment, and it is one of the three most important front-end equipment alongside the etching machine (25%) and PVD/CVD/ALD (25%). Chips can be made with a lithography machine. Lithography is only one part of the chip manufacturing process. It also needs the support of other six major front-end process equipment, and its importance is as important as the lithography machine.
Second, the most urgent thing in China is to create a lithography machine?
In fact, China is not short of lithography machines. What is missing are the other six types of process equipment controlled by American manufacturers (deposition, etching, ion implantation, cleaning, oxidation, and inspection).
Lithography machines are roughly divided into two categories:
1, DUV deep ultraviolet lithography machine: can prepare 0.13um to 7nm chips;
2. EUV extreme ultraviolet lithography machine: suitable for chips below 7nm to 3nm.
Under the current circumstances, DUV lithography machines are not restricted to China, and they are still being supplied normally, because the suppliers mainly come from ASML in Europe and the Netherlands, as well as Nikon and Canon in Japan. They are not directly subject to the US ban, but EUV is currently not available.
As mentioned in the previous report, we believe that China’s semiconductors will shift from a full external cycle to a dual cycle architecture of external cycle + internal cycle. Based on the reality that semiconductors are a global division of labor, the external cycle means uniting non-US equipment vendors. It is still a key and realistic choice. The current front-end equipment layout is:
1. Lithography machine: Monopolized by European ASML and Japan's Nikon and Canon;
2. Etching, deposition, ion implantation, cleaning, oxidation, and testing equipment: the United States and Japan monopolize the testing equipment, and the testing equipment is deeply monopolized by the US-based KLA.
Therefore, under the background of China's semiconductor production expansion, the top priority for the internal and external dual cycle is to rely on domestically produced and combined with Europe and Japan to replace the non-lithographic equipment controlled by the United States. Therefore, unlike most people understand, there is no shortage of Chinese semiconductor manufacturing. Lithography.
Three, "self-research" can solve the chip gap?
In fact, most of the current "self-developed" not only can not solve the current chip gap, but will exacerbate the chip shortage.
Because the so-called "self-developed" chips of major Internet companies/car manufacturers/mobile phone manufacturers are actually only the design of the chip, a step in the chip manufacturing process, and the most critical chip manufacturing is the difference between the chip products we lack. Now the world is short of cores. What is missing is not chip design, but the most important core chip manufacturing.
Now the nation’s self-developed chips will increase tape-out orders from fabs, and will continue to increase the gap between supply and demand for chip foundry capacity. Therefore, in the future, the chip gap can only be solved by Fab manufacturing plants (SMIC, Huahong), IDM plants (China Resources Micro, Changcun, Changxin), rather than "self-research" (chip design).
Relatively speaking, the threshold for chip design is relatively low, with quick start-up and quick results. The business model is similar to software development. China has already led the world in many chip design fabless fields. Take Huawei HiSilicon as an example, before the restricted chip foundry , HiSilicon’s various chip design strengths are already among the top two in the world.
So what needs support now is the field of chip manufacturing, not chip design (self-developed). Without the support of a solid fab foundry, fabless is just a mirage in the sky.
Four. At present, China only lacks high-end chips?
In fact, what China lacks is more mature technology. 8-inch is tighter than 12-inch, and 12-inch 90/55nm is tighter than 7/5nm.
Mature/advanced craftsmanship are very important and indispensable. Except AP and DRAM in a mobile phone, most of the other chips are mature craftsmanship. The chips needed for trams, especially power semiconductor chips/MCU chips, are mature 12 inches or 8 inches.
For China, there is not only a huge gap between 7/5/3nm and TSMC in the advanced process, but the larger gap is reflected in the production capacity of mature processes. Based on the equivalent 8-inch production capacity, SMIC’s production capacity is only 10% to 15% of TSMC’s. The gap is still huge and cannot meet domestic demand at all.
Especially domestic chip design listed companies, most of them are in mature process nodes, but there is no local matching mature foundry capacity and matching;
Weir’s CIS/PMIC/Driver, Zhaoyi’s innovative NOR and MCU, Goodix’s fingerprint recognition, Shengbang’s analog IC, and Zhuoshengwei’s radio frequency are all in the 12-inch mature technology (90～45nm). ) Instead of the so-called 14/10/7/5nm advanced process. More importantly, the trams and photovoltaic inverters/MCU/power chips that are currently in the most demanded are all completed on 8-inch mature production capacity. This is also the most scarce sector at present, and the scarcity exceeds the so-called "advanced" chips.
Therefore, the current priority is not 7/5/3nm, but to do a mature process first.
5. China wants to build its own semiconductor industry system independently?
In fact, semiconductors are a deeply globalized industry, and no country can achieve complete “localization”.
The current global layout of semiconductors is:
Semiconductor equipment: the United States as the mainstay, Europe and Japan as the supplement;
Semiconductor materials: Japan is the main material, and the United States and Europe are supplemented;
Chip foundry: Mainly Taiwan Province of China, supplemented by South Korea;
Memory chip: South Korea is the mainstay, the U.S. and Japan are the supplement;
Chip design: the United States is the mainstay, and the Chinese mainland is the supplement;
Chip packaging and testing: Taiwan Province of China is the main, and mainland China is a supplement;
EDA/IP: Mainly from the United States, supplemented by Europe.
Therefore, we can see that no country in the world can cover the entire semiconductor industry chain, so global cooperation is still the mainstream of the industry.
However, due to the technological friction between China and the United States, it is necessary for China to carry out a double cycle. That is to say, from the previous outer circulation as the main and the inner circulation as the auxiliary, the current outer circulation as the auxiliary and the inner circulation as the main.
Therefore, in the face of the United States’ constraints on China, the most urgent task is to replace the strong areas of the United States, and do our best to continue the external cycle outside the United States (Europe, Japan, etc.).
The core technology currently controlled by the United States is concentrated in semiconductor equipment (PVD, inspection, CVD, etching machine, cleaning machine, ion implantation, oxidation, epitaxy, annealing) other than lithography, and the other is EDA development software.
Risk reminder: the risk of intensified Sino-US trade frictions and intensified geopolitics; the risk of domestic substitution being less than expected; the risk of semiconductor downstream demand being less than expected.